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Table 3
Consistency of Bank Loss Reserve Decisions
for the years 1982-1985
Sample size = 82
Number Percentage
of Banks of Sample
Consistently
Conservative 1 > K0/K1 19 23.2%
Consistently
Aggressive < K0/K1 < 1 18 22.0%
Not Consistent 45 54.9%
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Abstract
The secondary market for trading Interest Rate Swaps has grown
considerably over the last few years. The purpose of this study is to
investigate the relationship between the pricing of interest rates as
well as changes in the rate of interest.
The results of this research indicate that the level of interest
rates are significant in determining the Bid and Ask spread in the
secondary swap market. Further downward movements in interest rates have
an inverse relationship with the Bid and Ask spread, as interest rates
fall the spread widens.

BID OFFER SPREADS FOR INTEREST RATE SWAPS
AND U.S. TREASURY YIELDS
Interest rate swaps are agreements between two parties to exchange
cash flows on assets or liabilities. For example, Company A may
prefer to service fixed rate debt whereas Company B prefers floating
rate debt. The raison de etre for swaps is that borrowers can get
their desired form of debt more cheaply by swapping than they -could on
their own because of either market imperfections in the debt market or
comparative advantage between borrowers. Bicksler and Chen (1986)
present two reasons for the existence of a market for swaps; 1) capi-
tal market imperfections; and, 2) comparative advantage among dif-
ferent borrowers in the market place. Smith, Smithson, and Wakeraan
(1986) present four reasons for the swap market; 1) financial
arbitrage opportunities, 2) profit opportunities from regulatory and
tax arbitrage, 3) lower transaction costs for some types of financial
risk exposure management; and, 4) financial market integration.
Regardless of the reason for the evolution of the swap market it
is probably safe to say that the market for swaps is well established
and will continue growing in the foreseeable future. As with most
primary financial markets, there comes a time when continued growth
and vitality requires the existence of a secondary market. The growth
of the secondary market for swaps will make possible the future growth
of the primary market for swaps.
Financial institutions act as matchmakers in the swaps market,
looking for parties which have different types of funding needs.
Since it is not always possible to exactly match the needs of both
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parties, these financial institutions often take swaps on to their own
books, for later matching or sale. The positioning of the financial
institution as one of the parties in the primary swap market has led
to an increase in the amount of swapping activity. However, it has
also led to a need for a secondary market where the financial insti-
tution can find liquidity or a mechanism for adjusting their risk
exposure.
This article examines th,e secondary market for swaps and empiri-
cally investigates the relationships between the level of interest
rate, changes in interest rates, and the pricing of swaps in the
secondary market.
Trading in Swaps
As interest rates change, a swap position develops an intrinsic
value, which can be either positive or negative depending on whether
interest rates have moved in a particular counterparty's favor or not.
In the secondary swap market, those who have positions in a swap with
a positive value can sell their swaps for cash and those which have
swap contracts with a negative value can get out of their position by
buying or paying cash to another party to assume their position.
Financial institutions, corporations, and other parties can buy and
sell swaps in the secondary market in order to make trading profits
and/or to adjust their risk profiles.
An alternative pricing model using option pricing is presented by
Whittaker (1987) and a more complete coverage of the pricing of swaps
is in Felgran (1987). However for this study we choose to take a
-3-
siraple NPV approach using intrinsic value. The terra intrinsic value
needs further amplification. It can be defined as the change in pres-
ent value of the future interest payments discounted at the current
level of interest rates. In Figure 1, we show the relationship be-
tween the intrinsic value of swap for a firm paying a floating rate
and receiving a fixed rate and changes in interest rates.
Intrinsic Value
Change in Interest Rates
Figure 1. Intrinsic Value of a Swap
For example today, July 1, 19XX, we assume that a firm has
borrowed $ lm for two years with a floating interest rate of L£B0R + l
percent due on July 1, 19X1 and 19X2 and enters into a swap for a
fixed interest rate of 10 percent for two years. One year later
(July 1, 19X1) interest rates have risen to 12 percent for a one year
fixed loan. The intrinsic value of the swap will be the present value
of the 2 percent additional interest for one year or
• • ,r ,
In I
1Intrinsic Value = P x
—r^r- x100 u«H >
c
en
-4-
where
P is the principal amount of the loan;
1 is the current rate of interest when pricing the swap;
N
l
n
is the fixed rate of interest for the swap;
t is the maturity of the swap.
In this case we have
• • <, , „ 12-10 1Intrinsic Value = ?lm x ryrz— x
100 (1.12) 1
= $17,857.14.
Hence, on July 1, 19X1, the swap can be sold in the secondary
market for the amount. The actual price that the firm receives for
its swap position is affected by two additional factors; 1) the credit
risk of the swap position and 2) transaction costs as evidenced by the
Bid and Ask Spread in the secondary market. Wall and Fung (1987)
discuss a way to evaluate the credit exposure risk of interest rate
swaps. The remainder of this paper is focused on the second of these
factors, namely the relationship between the Bid and Ask Spread and
the underlying interest rate.
Bid Ask Spreads and Interest Rates
As in any dealer based market, prices are quoted in terms of a bid
and ask spread. In the secondary swap oarket, prices are quoted
according to standardized procedures. The fixed interest rates paid
(offer) or received (bid) are quoted as spreads over the Treasury
yield or other index for a specific maturity. For example, a dealer
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might quote a bid price of 76 basis points and an offer price of 82
basis points over a 5-year Treasury yield of 7.63, which would give a
fixed rate to be paid of 8.45 and a fixed rate to be received of 8.39
for 5 years. The spread, Bid-Ask, of 6 basis points is quite common
for this market. Normally this Bid-Ask spread is in the range of 6 to
10 basis points. Hence, one round trip transaction for a dealer on a
$10m swap would provide between $6,000 to $10,000 in revenue.
The swap dealer assesses many factors in setting the bid-ask
spread. Among these are hedging costs, fees and commissions, credit
risk, the level of competition among swap dealers, the supply and
demand for fixed rate funds, and the level and direction of interest
rates.
The growth of the swap market has changed the structure of costs,
competition, and the way the dealers price swap transactions. When
the market first began, Bid and Ask spreads of 40 to 50 basis points
were not uncommon. These relatively high spreads compensated the
dealers for R&D costs and the attendant risk of participating in a new
market. The lack of extensive competition allowed the raispricing to
occur. However, as the swap market has grown and matured a fall in
costs as well as increased competition has lead to a Bid-Ask spread of
5 to 10 basis points for swaps in the 2- to 5-year maturity range.
The relationship between the level of interest rates and the Bid-
Ask spread is hypothesized to be positive. For example, if interest
rates are expected to be high over the life of the swap, it becomes
relatively more risky for the financial institution (dealer) to be the
fixed rate receiver than the fixed rate payer. Therefore, we would
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expect Che Bid-Ask. spread quoted to the market place to increase.
Likewise, if interest rates are relatively low over the life of the
swap it is more risky to be a fixed rate payer than a fixed rate
receiver; therefore, low levels of interest rates should be associated
with narrow Bid-Ask spreads. Hence, we posit the following relation-
ship between the Bid-Ask Spread and the level of interest rates
+
Spread - f(T Bill Rate) (2)
Given the foregoing discussion, not only are we interested in the
level of interest rates but also in the changes in interest rates.
Hence as interest rates rise we would expect the bid-ask spread to
widen and as interest rates fall we would expect the bid-ask spread to
narrow. The second hypothesis is
+
%A Spread = f(%A T Bill Rates ) (3a)K up up
%A Spread, = 6(%A T Bill Rates, ) (3b)r down down
Given these three hypotheses as shown by Equations 2, 3a, and 3b,
we now present a discussion of the data and methodology used in this
study.
Data and Methodology
In order to avoid the problems associated with a new and growing
market, our study is limited to the period of February 1987 to
February 1988. Two hundred forty-one daily quotes of bid and ask
prices for 2- and 5-year spreads were provided by Noonan, Astley and
Pearce, Inc., a foreign exchange and money market broker in New York
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City. Yields on 2-year U.S. T Bills and 5-year U.S. T-Notes were
taken from the daily issues of the Financial Times of London .
The relationship between the level of interest rates and the Bid
and Ask spread was tested by the following regression equations.
^YR.t 5 = ° + 8 1 TBILL2YR,t + «t (4a)
<A-B5YR,t>
' a+B
'l
™°TE
5YR,t
+ e
t
'
(4b)
where
B is the Bid price on a 2-year or 5-year swap on day t;
A is the Ask price on a 2-year or 5-year swap on day t;
TBILL is the rate on 2-year T Bills on day t;
Z I K. ) t
TNOTE is the rate on 5-year T-Notes on day t.
JI tv > t
The positive relationship between the size of the Bid-Ask spread
and the level of interest rates implies that 8, and 3. are positive.
The daily percentage change of the Bid-Ask Spread and Interest
Rates was calculated by Equations 5a and 5b.
(A-B)
t+1
" (A-B)
t%A Spread =
,
> (5a)(A-B)
(T Bill Rate) - (T Bill Rate)
%i T B1U RatSS " (T Bill Rate)
~ (5b)
t
If the result of Equation 5b was greater than zero, that day was
classified as an up day for interest rates as well as for %A Spread,
if the results were less than or equal to zero, thac day was classi-
fied as a down day. Looking at the data for down days revealed that
during the crash of October 1987 (October 19 to November 4) not only
did the T Bill and T-Note rate fall as a result of the flight to
quality, but the Bid-Ask spread more than doubled as a result of the
uncertainties in the market place. Hence the regressions run to test
the down change relationships (6b and 6d) were run two ways. First,
all down days were included and then those down days associated with
the October 1987 crash were omitted for the data set. The regression
equations run to test the change relationships are:
%A SpreadOVD = a + 8 %A T Bill + e„ (6a)r 2YR,t,up 2 t,up t
%A Spread0VD „ . = a + 6- %A T Bill , + e„ (6b)r 2YR,t,down 2 t,down t
%A Spread, VD = a + 8-, %A T Note t = e tr 5YR,t,up 3 t,down t
t
%A Spread,..., = a + Q %A T Note t + e5YR,t,down 3 t,down t
(6c)
(6d)
For 6a and 6c, the expected sign of the beta is positive. And for
6b and 6d, the hypothesized sign for the beta is negative indicating
an inverse relationship between a downward change in the interest rate
and a widening of the spread.
Results
Table 1 gives the results of the regression for Equations 4a and
4b. As expected, the significantly positive beta indicates that as
the level of interest rates is high, the Bid-Ask spread is wider than
when the level of interest rates is low. This is true for both the
2-year T Bill and the 5-year T-Note.
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Table 1
Regression Results for Interest Rate Levels and Spreads
(A-B) 2YR,t
=
°
+ e
i
TBILL
2YR,t
+ S
i
Q
i
= 1.41
Standard
Error = .45
R
2
= .16
ft = 241
(A-B) 5YR,t
= a+ 3
1
TN°TE
5YR,t
+ 6
i
s| = 1.23
Standard
Error = .26
R
2
= .19
to = 241
Table 2 contains the results of the regressions for Equations 6a,
6b, 6c, and 6d. For positive changes in the T Bill and T-Note rate of
interest there is no statistically significant relationship between
increases in the 3id Ask Spread and increases in the interest rate.
However, for downward changes in the T Bill and T-Note rates there is
a significantly positive relationship between interest rate decreases
and a narrowing spread. As can be seen from a comparison of the two
regressions with or without the impact of the October 87 Crash, there
is a statistically negative relationship between downward changes in
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the interest rate and a widening spread. However, for the entire
sample (October Crash included) the relationship is much more signifi-
cant .
Table 2
Regression Results for Percentage Changes in
Interest Rates and Spreads
%A Spread0VD = a + O %A TBILL + er 2YR,t,up 2 t,up t
All Data
6
2
= 5.48
Standard
error = 16.07
R
2
=
to = 144
%A Spread cvn = a + 6 %A TNOTE + e* 5YR,t,up 3 t,up t
All Data
6
3
= 18.24
Standard
error = 12.74
R
2
= .03
& = 136
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Table 2 (continued)
%A Spread2YR>t)d
All Data
= a + B %A TBILL , + e,
own 2 t ,down t
Crash Data Excluded
= - 77.86
Standard
error = 19.65
R
2
= .18
m = 96
8
2
= -21.68
Standard
error = 8.91
2
R = .12
m = 88
%A Spread, VD = a + 6. %A TNOTE^ , + e^* 5YR,t,down 3 t.down t
All Data
8 = -114.53
Standard
error = 16.49
R
2
= .41
m = 104
Crash Data Excluded
8^ = -39.53
Standard
error = 19.27
R
2
= .16
m = 96
Conclusions
In pricing interest rate swaps of a given maturity, the market
participants consider many factors such as credit risk, of the counter-
parties, transaction costs, the level of interest rates, changes in
interest rates, and the supply and demand for interest rate swaps.
The results of this research indicate that the level of interest rates
are significant in determining the Bid and Ask. spread in the swap
market. Further, downward movement in interest rates has an inverse
relationship with the Bid and Ask spread, as interest rates fall the
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Bid Ask spread widens. In a period of extreme interest rate move-
ments, for example the October 87 Crash, this relationship is intensi-
fied.
For upward movements in the interest rates, there does not seem to
be a statistically identifiable relationship between increases in the
interest rates and the Bid and Ask spread. This would imply that some
of the other factors as mentioned above play a more important -role in
spread determination when rates are rising. Further work is needed in
quantifying and gathering data on the other factors so that a more
complete explanation can be offered for the pricing of interest rate
swaps.
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